Developing a Framework for Dynamic Risk Assessment Using Bayesian Networks and Reliability Data by Kanes, Rym et al.
 
 
Developing a Framework for Dynamic Risk Assessment Using Bayesian Networks 
and Reliability Data 
Rym Kanesa*and Clementina Ramirez-Marengob, Hazem Abdel-Moatia, Jack Cranefielda and 
Luc Véchotb 
aExxonMobil Research Qatar Science and Technology Park, PO Box  22500, Doha, Qatar 
bMary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Qatar, Texas A&M University at Qatar, PO Box 
27874, Doha, Qatar 
* Corresponding author: rym.kanes@exxonmobil.com 
Abstract 
Process Safety in the oil and gas industry is managed through a robust Process Safety Management 
(PSM) system that involves the assessment of the risks associated with a facility in all steps of its 
life cycle. Risk levels tend to fluctuate throughout the life cycle of many processes due to several 
time varying risk factors (performances of the safety barriers, equipment conditions, staff 
competence, incidents history, etc.). While current practices for quantitative risk assessments (e.g. 
Bow-tie analysis, LOPA, etc.) have brought significant improvements in the management of major 
hazards, they are static in nature and do not fully take into account the dynamic nature of risk and 
how it improves risk-based decision making 
In an attempt to continually enhance the risk management in process facilities, the oil and gas 
industry has put in very significant efforts over the last decade toward the development of process 
safety key performance indicators (KPI or parameters to be observed) to continuously measure or 
gauge the efficiency of safety management systems and reduce the risks of major incidents.  This 
has increased the sources of information that are used to assess risks in real-time. The use of such 
KPIs has proved to be a major step forward in the improvement of process safety in major hazards 
facilities. Looking toward the future, there appears to be an opportunity to use the multiple KPIs 
measured at a process plant to assess the quantitative measure of risk levels at the facility on a 
time-variant basis. 
ExxonMobil Research Qatar (EMRQ) has partnered with the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety 
Center – Qatar (MKOPSC-Q) to develop a methodology that establishes a framework for a tool 
that monitors in real time the potential increases in risk levels as a result of pre-identified risk 
factors that would include the use of KPIs (leading or lagging) as observations or evidence using 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BN). 
In this context, the paper presents a case study of quantitative risk assessment of a process unit 
using BN. The different steps of the development of the BN are detailed, including: translation of 
a Bowtie into a skeletal BBN, modification of the skeletal BN to incorporate KPIs (loss of primary 
containment (LOPC), equipment, management and human related), and testing of the BBN with 
forward and backward inferences. The outcomes of the dynamic modeling of the BN with real 
time insertion of evidence are discussed and recommendation for the framework for a dynamic 
risk assessment tool are made. 
Keywords Bowtie analysis, Bayesian Networks Applications, Reliability, Process Safety 
Performance Metrics 
1 Introduction 
Chemical process industries are complex networks that involve various equipment and control 
loops, along with skilled operators all working together to harmonize production throughout the 
process lifecycle. In order to ensure smooth operation, it is necessary to understand the hazards 
and risks associated, as well as any possible accident scenarios and their mitigation. It follows that 
the dynamic nature of these chemical processes extend to their accompanying risks as seen in 
Figure 1. Risk levels in a process facility tend to fluctuate due to several time-varying factors 
including: variations in the integrity and vulnerability of safety barriers, equipment aging, planned 
activities and maintenance, shutdown, start-up, simultaneous operations, changes in the safety 
culture of the company, health and efficiency of the management system, commitment to safety of 
the leadership and process safety incidents (incidents or near misses). 
It is important to quantify these time-dependent factors and their relationships using engineering 
and mathematical techniques, in order to develop quantitative estimates of risk that are then 
compared to some defined risk criteria that translates a company’s risk tolerability. Traditional 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methods include HAZOP, What-if Analysis, Bow-Tie 
Analysis, Fault and Event Trees, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). However, these methods 
are limited in that they tend to convey static values of risk at a given time and are simply not 
designed to capture the dynamic nature of risk. It is therefore important to focus research on this 




Figure 1. Dynamic behavior of risk 
 
More recently, Bayesian Belief Networks (BNs) which are probabilistic graphical models that 
allow for the quantification of complex relational dependencies using Bayes’ theorem, have gained 
traction in various engineering fields, including the area of process safety. BNs represent a set of 
random variables and their relationship through a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each node of the 
DAG represents a random variable. The directed arcs connect pairs of nodes which follow a cause-
effect relationship. A node is called a “parent node” if there is a directed arc connecting it to another 
node, the “child node”. Nodes which have no parent are known as “root nodes” as seen in Figure 
2 [1]. 
 
Figure 2. Bayesian network – directed acyclic graph 
 
Probability values are assigned to each node of the BN. The main objective of BNs is to estimate 
and update the distribution probabilities of the random variables based on given evidence and prior 
knowledge. The calculation of the probabilities of the “child” nodes are based on a combination 
of the probability of the “parent” nodes and conditional probability tables according to the well-
known “Bayes rule” of conditional probability. The analysis of the probability associated to the 
nodes can follow two paths: 
 Predictive analysis or forward approach: Probability values are defined a priori for root 
nodes and calculated by inference for the other nodes. 
 Diagnostic analysis or backward approach: Probability values of the nodes are calculated 
a posteriori when observations become available. For example, BNs therefore provide a 
method to update our beliefs about the occurrence of an event “A” given the information 
of an observed event “B”. 
The way probability nodes are treated in a BN and its capability to represent dependencies between 
variables and provide updated probability values makes BNs a very interesting method to use real 
time data to update values of risks in process facilities. Hence, BNs have been applied for risk 
analysis and decision making and risk management. Weber et al. (2012) conducted a literature 
review over the application of Bayesian Networks to dependability, risk analysis, risk management 
and maintenance and showed a raising trend of the literature related to these domains [2]. This 
increasing trend is due to the advantages that Bayesian Networks provide in contrast to other static 
classical analysis methods such as fault trees, event trees and Bowties. BNs are also becoming one 
of the preferred tools for risk management applications [3]  
Currently, there has been significant work carried out on the use of BN to overcome the limitations 
of classical risk analysis. In this context, BNs have been applied for predicting the probability of 
occurrence of undesired consequences. This application involves the mapping of classical risk 
analysis techniques such as the Fault Tree (FT), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Bowtie 
into a BN [4].  
Khakzad et al. (2011) presented a mapping algorithm to translate a FT into a BN, based on the 
algorithm developed by Bobbio et. al. (2001) [1]. The resulting BN was used to assess the 
performance of a feeding control system transferring propane from an evaporator to a scrubbing 
column [5]. Later, Khakzad et al. (2013) presented a dynamic approach where a bowtie was 
mapped into a BN. BNs were used to update the probability of occurrence of a vapor cloud 
explosion based on observed evidence. Evidence such as loss of containment events and near 
misses registered during 4 years were used to update the probability of a vapor cloud explosion 
[6]. 
Cai et. al. (2013) used BNs to perform a risk assessment that takes into account human factors in 
an offshore blowout scenario. Individual, organizational and group factors were represented in the 
bowtie that was mapped into a BN [7]. Ayello et. al (2014) applied BNs to assess the of different 
types of oil pipeline corrosion (Internal, external, stress induced). The variables included in the 
analysis were soil conditions, wetting and drying cycles, presence of organic decay products, 
coating types, pipe surface conditions, temperature, cathodic protection, chemistry under coating, 
etc. [8,10].  
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) are an extension of BNs where variables are correlated to 
each other over time steps. DBNs often consist of two different time steps and are called two-time-
slice BNs. In a two-time slice BN the value of a variable can be calculated from the immediate 
prior value (time t-1) at any point in time “t. Lately, DBNs have been applied in risk assessment 
for estimating probabilities over different periods of time. Abimbola et al. (2014) mapped a Bowtie 
into a DBN in order to gain a real-time estimate of the probability of failure of barriers related to 
preventing a hydrocarbon blowout, thereby ensuring safe offshore drilling operations [11].  
Khakzad (2015) developed a DBN to estimate the propagation of heat radiation in a scenario where 
one of 3 atmospheric storage tanks containing acetone and benzene is under fire. The BN allowed 
for estimation of the most probable sequence of events that would result in a domino effect within 
the facility [12]. Barua et al. (2016) proposed a Bayesian Network model for dynamic operational 
risk assessment. The BN model was developed from a dynamic fault tree, where Boolean states 
(failure and success) were used to indicate the probability of failure of specific process equipment 
[13]. Later on, Wu et al. (2016) developed a Dynamic Bayesian Network Model (DBN) based on 
a Bowtie model for predicting the change of the probability potentially hazardous scenarios with 
time. Boolean states (Yes and No) were used for represent if and event or equipment failure 
occurs[14]. 
Current work in the literature demonstrates the capability of BNs for updating the values of risk 
based on observed evidence. Primarily, the random variables have Boolean states (i.e. failure or 
success of safety barriers). The type of evidence used for updating was either the observation of 
equipment failure or consequences over a certain period of time. However, in a process plant many 
other parameters or process safety indicators (PSIs) can be used as evidence. These indicators 
could be of different natures, and may include reliability related, operational indicators, human 
and organizational, demands on safety systems, etc.  
The purpose of this work is to develop a framework for a BN that calculates the dynamic risk with 
time based reliability data (failure rate, probability of failure on demand, time horizon until the 
next scheduled maintenance, and the characteristic life of equipment) and updates risk based on 
insertion of evidence such as equipment failures and time to failure (TTF) for continuous 
operation. The BN will also be used to demonstrate the effect of maintenance on the overall 
probability of consequences. The BN method used in this study incorporates the use of both 
Boolean and continuous random variables, as well as the Boolean and continuous causal 
relationships between them, which is one of the main differences between this work and others 
within this field. A proprietary Bayesian Networks software was used for the estimation of updated 
probabilities. This work is a collaborative effort between ExxonMobil Research Qatar and the 
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University in Qatar and aims to 
establish the framework for developing a dynamic risk assessment tool to determine the current 
risk level for a given process area or facility.  
2 Reliability Modeling 
Over the last decade the process industry put very significant efforts in the development of process 
safety key performance indicators (KPIs) (or parameters to be observed) to continuously monitor 
the health of safety management systems, the integrity of safety barriers and reduce the risk of 
major incidents [15,19]. However, there still seems to be no clear links between the multiple 
parameters measured at a process plant and the quantitative measure of risk levels (through a QRA) 
at the facility. 
Monitoring meaningful reliability indicators drive an increment in equipment and active safety 
barriers reliability. Reliability and risk are linked, increasing reliability can reduce the risk of 
undesired events in process facilities. The term reliability is associated to the probability that 
equipment or a system will perform as intended for a specific time horizon. Whereas, the 
probability that a piece of equipment or a system will fail at a given time is known as probability 
of failure. The probability of failure can be assessed through different parameters and functions 
such as the time to failure and the failure rate function. 
The time to failure (TTF) is the time elapsing from when a piece of equipment/safety barrier are 
put into operations until they fail for the first time [20]. TTF is a random variable that can be 
represented through probability distributions. The failure rate function is related to the time to 
failure probability distribution and it provides an estimate on how the probability of failure of 
equipment changes over time. The failure rate can be considered as constant or time dependent. 
The failure rate time-dependency is well represented by the so-called bathtub curve as seen in 
Figure 3. The bathtub curve profile represents the three stage of the life cycle of equipment or 
safety barriers: wear-in, useful life and wear-out modes. The wear-in mode has a decreasing failure 
rate and it well represents the early stages of the lifecycle of equipment (where it can fail mainly 
due to the manufacturing defects). The useful life accounts for failures caused by random events; 




Figure 3. The bathtub curve 
Equipment and safety barriers in process plants are at different stages of their life cycle. Hence, 
when moving towards a dynamic risk assessment it is critical to address the characteristic stage of 
the lifecycle of these barriers. In system reliability, the Weibull distribution is widely used for 
modelling each one of the lifecycle stages of equipment. This probability distribution is a function 
of two different parameters: shape and scale. The shape parameter (β) indicates the stage of the 
lifecycle of equipment, where  < 1, represents the wear-in stage,  < 1 represents the useful life, 
1< < 4 represents the wear-out stage, and   4 represents the rapid wear-out stage. On the other 
hand, the scale parameter is an indicator of the failure rate per hour of equipment/safety barriers 
[20].  
3 Framework for Dynamic Risk Assessment 
The proposed methodology is comprised of different steps for the construction of a DBN with 
discrete-continuous variables as seen in Figure 4. The resulting BN is called a hybrid (discrete-
continuous nodes) DBN and it can be constructed from an existing bowtie diagram by mapping 
the fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET). 
 
 
Figure 4. Framework for performing a dynamic risk assessment using BN 
 
3.1 Development of the Skeletal BN 
In order to develop the skeletal BN, an algorithm exists to map a fault tree into a BN, including 
graphical and numerical translation of the fault tree. Graphically, the structure of the BN is 
developed from the fault tree such that the top event and the causes shown in the fault tree are 
represented by nodes and arcs in the BN. The relationships within the causes and the top event in 
the fault tree are modeled with two types of gates: OR Gate and AND Gate. According to the type 
of gate, conditional probabilities are assigned to each one of the nodes as seen in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. AND/OR gates conditional probability tables 
 
The procedure of mapping a FT into a BN consists of a nodal representation of each safety barrier 
of the FT in the BN. Each of the nodes will have two possible states: failure or success. A nodal 
representations of the consequences (from ET) was used as well. The consequence node has many 
states, each one of them representing the possible consequences shown in the ET. 
3.2 Modification of the BN to Incorporate Reliability Data 
For equipment that operates continuously, it is important to consider different parameters such as 
the probability of failure within a specified horizon “t” (i.e. the time before the next 
inspection/preventive maintenance) and the time to failure (TTF) for equipment under continuous 
operation. The TTF for equipment can be represented by continuous probability density functions 
such as the Exponential, Weibull or Gamma Distribution. In this work, nodes represented by 
continuous distributions are introduced into the BN. Therefore, the resulting BN is a hybrid type 
with a mixed of continuous- discrete nodes. 
For equipment still in the useful life stage, the time to failure can be calculated as the inverse of 
the constant failure rate of a system, equipment or safety barrier. On the other hand, for cases 
where the failure rate is time dependent (for equipment during the wear-in and wear-out stages its 
lifecycle), the Weibull distribution with appropriate shape parameters can be used. 
The simple mapping of a bowtie described earlier cannot be used when continuous nodes are 
introduced into the BN. In order to build the hybrid BN, deterministic functions are used as 
conditional node probability tables for translating the OR and AND gates. These functions are 
summarized in Table 1 [21]. After the continuous TTF distributions and the deterministic 
functions for the AND/OR gate are provided as inputs into the BN nodes, the probability of failure 
for each continuous node can be computed.  
  
Table 1. AND/OR gate functions for continuous TTF distributions 
Gate Output event TTF distribution 
function 
Probability of failure function 
AND All i-input 
components of the 
gate must fail. 
 
i
iAND TTFTTF max      tTTFPtTTFP i
i
AND  max  
OR At least one of the i-
input components of 
the gate must fail. 
 
i
iOR TTFTTF min      tTTFPtTTFP iiOR  min  
 
3.3 Creation of the DBN 
To transform the hybrid BN into a hybrid DBN, it is necessary to modify the structure of the BN 
for discrete nodes as follows: 
 Identification of the parent nodes in the BN 
 Creation of prior and posterior nodes for each parent nodes.  
Connected prior and posterior nodes associated to a given parent node are used to capture the 
change of probability with time. For each time step, evidence is first set and the posterior 
probability values of each node are calculated, given the inserted evidence and the prior probability 
value of the node.  
3.4 Evaluation of the Dynamic Risk Profile 
As a function of time 
Continuous probability distributions are used to represent the TTF of equipment under continuous 
operation can be included in the BN. The probability of the consequences is calculated for different 
specified time horizons t (i.e. the probability of the consequences if no inspection/maintenance are 
given in a period of 3 months, 6 months, etc.). The different specified time periods are 1, 3, 6, 9, 
12, 15 and 18 months.  
As a function of time and insertion of evidence 
Continuous probability distributions are used to represent the TTF of equipment under continuous 
operation, and can also be included in the BN. The probability of the consequences is calculated 
for different specified time horizons t (monthly time intervals can be used). In addition, evidence 
of failure of equipment is inserted every month for the sake of simplicity (other time units can be 
used). Thus, the risk profile is generated taking into account the effect of time and the observed 
evidence. 
4 Case Study 
This section presents a case study that applies the proposed framework for a dynamic risk 
assessment using Bayesian Networks. The scenario of choice is an extension of the case study 
performed by M. Tweeddale, Managing Risk and Reliability of Process Plants, Gulf Professional 
Publishing, 2003 [22], which focused on the heating oil section of a plant delivering hot oil to 
heating coils of bitumen tanks. The oil is returned to the bitumen tanks by the circulating pump 
through a gas-fired heater. 
The flow should be controlled through the heater, or the heater coils may overheat and rupture, 
resulting in a large fire. The flow control system is composed of a transducer (FE), a flow controller 
(FC) and a flow control valve (FCV). A manual bypass valve (MBV), which normally remains in 
a closed position, is used if FCV is down for routine maintenance. If the flow of the heating oil is 
below the desired level, the solenoid valve (SV) will be activated by the signal of the transducer 
FE and the temperature control valve (TCV) will be closed. The flow switch activates the low-
flow alarm (FAL), to alert the operator for opening the MBV or closing the manual gas isolation 
valve (GIV). In addition to the flow control system, a high-temperature switch (TSH) is placed in 
the oil delivery line. In case an increased temperature is measured by the TSH,  it will activate the 
solenoid valve SV and close the temperature control valve [22]. 
The corresponding bowtie diagram was constructed with the Heater Coils Burn Out as the Top 
Event, and is shown in Figure 6. In this example, the possible consequences, as seen in Table 2, 
depend on different factors: i) if the leaking oil finds an ignition source, the leak is isolated very 
quickly and ii) if the oil contacts operator. 
 
 
Figure 6. Heater coils burn-out scenario – Schematic Bowi 
 
Table 2. Possible Consequences 
Consequences Description 
C1 Operator burn, minor plant damage 
C2 and C6 Minor plant damage 
C3 Operator burnt, major plant damage 
C4 and C8 Major plant damage 
C5 Operator inconvenience, minor plant damage 
C7 Operator inconvenience, major plant damage 
C9 No consequences 
The probability of failure values mentioned in Table 3, which were used for constructing the BN, 
were taken from the original case study [22]. The BN obtained from mapping the bowtie is shown 
in Figure 7, while the estimated values of the probability consequences are summarized in Table 
4, and These results are the initial values of risk obtained by mapping the traditional bowtie in a 
BN and do not include any updates on probability values.  
 
Table 3. Probability of failure of equipment and safety barriers 
Node State Probability 
SV Failure 1.25×10-2 
 Success 9.87×10-1 
TCV Failure 6.26×10-3 
 Success 9.94×10-1 
FAL Failure 6.25×10-3 
 Success 9.94×10-1 
Operator Failure 1.00×10-1 




Figure 7. Resulting BN from mapping the Bowtie 
  
Table 4. Initial values of the probability of the consequence 
Consequence Probability of the Consequence 
C1 8.08 × 10-5 
C2 3.96.6650 × 10-3 
C3 2.69 × 10-5  
C4 2.66 × 10-3 
C5 2.38 × 10-6 
C6 4.52 × 10-5 
C7 1.01 × 10-6 
C8 1.94 × 10-5 
C9 9.93 × 10-1 
 
4.1 Modification of the BN to Incorporate Reliability Data 
The following reliability data is incorporated into the BN:  
 The time to failure of equipment operating continuously  
 The horizon time until next maintenance is schedule t 
 Failure rate 
 The characteristic stage of equipment  
 Probability of failure for equipment which works upon demand 
The BN was modified to incorporate the use of TTF distribution. A Weibull distribution is used 
for representing the TTF distribution of the pump, FE and FS. The Weibull distribution parameters 
were taken from available literature data of equipment failure rates in the useful life as seen in 
Table 5 [23]. 
 
Table 5. Equipment/Safety barriers Weibull distribution parameters 
Equipment/Safety 
Barrier 
Shape parameter (useful 
life) 
Scale parameter (failure rate) 
Pump 1 9.18 × 10-5 
FE/FS 1 7.29 × 10-6 
 
When using TTF continuous distributions, the conditional probability tables (CPTs) are obtained 
as deterministic functions of the parents. The probability of failure of the system at a given time, 
t, can be obtained from the TTF distribution e.g. )()( tTTFPFailPumpP Pump  . The resulting 
BN will be hybrid with both continuous (time-dependent variables) and discrete variables 
(probability of success/failure) as seen in Figure 8. The TTF distribution functions for the 
AND/OR gates CPTs and the probability of failure functions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 8. Hybrid BN with continuous TTF distributions 
 
4.2 Evaluation of the Dynamic Risk Profile 
Evaluation of the risk increment as a function of time 
Continuous TTF distributions for the pump, FE and FS are included in the BN. The probability of 
the consequences if no inspection/maintenance was calculated for these specified intervals of time, 
t: 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18 months.  
Evaluation of the risk increment as a function of time and the insertion of evidence 
Continuous TTF distributions for the pump, FE and FS are included in the BN. The probability of 
the consequences was calculated for these specified intervals of time, t: 1, 2 and 3 months. In 
addition, evidence of equipment failure is inserted as described in Table 6. The modified BN with 
the insertion of evidence can be seen in Figure 9- Figure 11.  
 
Table 6. Observed evidence 
Month Evidence 
1 SV fail 
2 FE fails after 1440 hours of operation 
3 Pump fails after 2160 hours of operation 
 
 








Figure 11. BN with pump failure (after 2160 hours of operation) used as evidence 
 
To obtain the dynamic risk profile, the calculation of updated risk values, based on observation or 
evidence, over time is necessary. For equipment with discrete nodes, this requires a two-step 
process which includes:  
 The insertion of evidence in the BN and the recalculation of the probability of the nodes 
(variables) of the BN given equipment failure evidence. 
 The calculation of the probability of each node of the BN at a given time step given the 
probability of the node at the previous time step. The conditional probability values for 
posterior nodes are presented in Table 7 and were obtained from expert judgment. For the 
sake of simplicity, the same conditional probability table (CPT) was used for each one of 
the parent nodes. CPTs can be assigned based on expert opinion or literature data if 
available. 
 
Table 7. CPT for posterior nodes calculation 
Prior Node State Failure Success 
Failure 0.4 0.1 
Success 0.6 0.9 
 
Figure 12 shows how prior and posterior nodes are connected to capture the change of probability 
with time. For each time step, evidence is first set and the posterior probability values of each node 
is calculated given the evidence and the prior probability value of the node. 
 
 
Figure 12. Prior and posterior nodes associated to a given parent node 
 
For equipment, it was assumed that once a failure occurs, the equipment is repaired and it returns 
to an “as good as new” condition. 
5 Results 
For comparison purposes, the initial risk values (at time 0) were estimated using two modeling 
approaches: a discrete BN and a hybrid BN Figure 13. The obtained results show that when TTF 
continuous distributions (hybrid BN) are included into the BN, the initial predicted risk values are 
lower by three orders of magnitude for the consequences, when compared to values obtained by 
using just discrete nodes (discrete BN). The difference among the predicted values can be 
explained by the fact that the probability of failure of equipment/safety barriers increases as 
function of time and thus, lower probability values would be expected at early stages of a plant. 
The calculated values are summarized in Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 13. Probability of the consequences for discrete and hybrid BNs 
 
Table 8. Initial probability of the consequences for the Discrete and Hybrid BNs 
Consequence Discrete BN Hybrid BN 
C1 8.08 × 10-5 6.43 × 10-8 
C2 3.96 × 10-3 3.15× 10-6  
C3 2.69 × 10-5  2.12 × 10-6 
C4 2.66 × 10-3 2.14× 10-8 
C5 2.38× 10-6 1.89× 10-9 
C6 4.52 × 10-5 3.60 × 10-8 
C7 1.02 × 10-6 8.12 × 10-10 
C8 1.94× 10-5 1.54 × 10-8 
 
In addition, by incorporating TTF continuous distributions, risk can be calculated as a function of 
time for the case where no inspection or maintenance is provided as shown in Figure 14 and 
Figure 15. The calculated values are summarized in Table 9. For example, if no maintenance is 
scheduled in 3 months, the value of the probability of the consequences increases by almost three 
order of magnitudes for each one of the possible consequences. Thus, predicting the risk increase 
becomes highly important as this information can be used in decision-making to optimize the time 
intervals between inspection and preventive maintenance. 
 
 




Figure 15. Probability of the consequences as a function of time  
 
 
Table 9. Probability of the consequence values as a function of time 
 Months 
 1 3 6 9 12 15 18 
C1 9.18×10-6 6.89×10-5 2.38×10-4 2.77×10-4 7.64×10-4 1.10×10-3 1.43×10-3 
C2 4.50×10-4 3.38×10-3 1.17×10-2 1.36×10-2 3.80×10-2 5.39×10-2 7.02×10-2 
C3 3.03×10-3 2.28×10-3 7.85×10-3 9.14×10-3 2.56×10-2 3.63×10-2 4.73×10-2 
C4 3.06×10-6 2.29×10-5 7.93×10-5 9.23×10-5 2.58×10-4 3.67×10-4 4.77×10-4 
C5 2.70×10-7 2.03×10-6 7.01×10-6 8.16×10-6 2.28×10-5 3.24×10-5 4.22×10-5 
C6 5.14×10-6 3.86×10-5 1.33×10-4 1.55×10-4 4.34×10-4 6.16×10-4 8.01×10-4 
C7 1.16×10-6 8.70×10-7 3.00×10-6 3.50×10-6 9.78×10-6 1.39×10-5 1.81×10-5 
C8 2.20×10-6 1.65×10-5 5.71×10-5 6.64×10-5 1.86×10-4 2.64×10-4 3.44×10-4 
C9 9.99×10-1 9.94×10-1 9.80×10-1 9.77×10-1 9.35×10-1 9.07×10-1 8.79×10-1 
 
 
When equipment failure information is inserted as evidence in addition to the effect of time, the 
predicted values of risk increase considerably in various order of magnitude. For example, the 
probability of the most severe consequence “C3-Operator burnt, major plant damage”, went from 
2.1236x10-6 to 1.9458x10-1, after the failure of the pump and the flow control components. The 
obtained dynamic profile is shown in Figure 16 and the increasing risk values can be observed in 
Figure 17. The obtained values for the probability of the consequences are summarized in Table 
10. 
 




Figure 17. Probability of the consequences as a function of time and the insertion of evidence 
 
 
Table 10. Probability of the consequences as a function of time and evidence 
 Month 0 Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 
C1 6.43×10-8 2.25×10-4 1.49×10-3 5.90×10-3 
C2 3.15×10-6 1.10×10-2 7.35×10-2 2.89×10-1 
C3 2.12×10-6 7.44×10-3 4.93×10-2 1.95×10-1 
C4 2.14×10-8 7.51×10-5 4.98×10-4 1.97×10-3 
C5 1.89×10-9 6.64×10-6 4.40×10-5 1.73×10-4 
C6 3.60×10-8 1.26×10-4 8.36×10-4 3.30×10-3 
C7 8.12×10-10 2.84×10-6 1.88×10-5 7.44×10-5 
C8 1.54×10-10 5.40×10-5 3.58×10-4 1.41×10-3 
 
6 Conclusions 
The application of Bayesian Networks provides several advantages towards the development of a 
tool for real-time risk assessment due to their capability for updating probability values given 
observations. This property of BN can be used to overcome the limitations of current QRA 
techniques which are static in nature and does not provide a real-time estimation of risk.  
Measuring meaningful reliability indicators improve the performance of equipment and active 
safety barriers. Reliability and risk are linked, increasing reliability can reduce the risk of undesired 
events in process plants. Nevertheless, there still seems to be no clear link between the reliability 
data measured at a process plant and the quantitative measure of risk. This work incorporates 
reliability related data such as failure rate, time to failure, life cycle stage of equipment and 
different time horizons for scheduled maintenance into the risk assessment.  
The increasing probability of failure of equipment as a function of time if no 
inspection/maintenance is provided, has an important effect in the estimated risk values. Risk can 
increase two or three orders of magnitude if a good maintenance program is not in place. The 
proposed approach provides a useful tool to support decision making, since it can be used to 
optimize the maintenance intervals. 
Results demonstrate the importance of updating the estimated risk values given real-time observed 
risk factors (equipment failure and effect of time) in the facility. The updated probability of the 
consequence values can be several order of magnitudes higher than the initial predicted values 
(obtained from the static analysis). When evidence of equipment failure is used to update the value 
of risk, this approach can be applied to identify equipment and safety barriers that are critical to 
maintain safe operations and to quantify the increment of risk in case their failure. The 
identification critical equipment and safety barrier in combination with the evaluation of risk over 
time can be used to support decision-makers to point out the equipment that will require continuous 
inspection and maintenance. 
Future research work includes the extension of this approach to repairable systems for including 
the time to repair (TTR). In addition, the approach must also be extended to include human factors 
KPIs.  
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